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l1N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
- vs. -
C. W. BRADY, JR., 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Thjs is a criminal action initiated by indictment 
charging defendant with 1st degree perjury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant was convicted by a petit jury. The judg-
ment of conviction was after denial of a motion for a 
new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks to reverse the judgment of 
conviction and the dismissal of the action. 
STATEMENT OF F.&OTS 
The indictment (R. 1-3) accuses the defendant of 
having testified falsely on the 7th day of May, 1965 
2 
before the Honorable l\fauric0 D. Jones, Judge of thP 
City Court, Salt Lake City. The indictment is set forth 
in Schedule A of the appendices. The bracketed por-
tions as shown on Schedule A are our own markings, 
with the letters in the left-hand margin corresponding 
with the same lettered subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of 
the Instruction No. 6 (R. 68-71), which instruction is 
set forth in full in Schedule B of the appendices. 
During the year 1963 and the portion of the year 
1964 covered by Judge Jones in his questioning of the 
defendant Mr. Brady was Chairman of the Salt Lake 
County Board of Commissioners, in charge of Roads 
and Bridges, Sanitation and Flood Control. At the time 
of his deposition on May 7, 1965, Mr. Brady was Com-
missioner of Public Safety for the State of Utah. The 
Grand Jury for Salt Lake County was convened in 
July of 1965. 
The bill of particulars ( R. 12-14) as furnished by 
the District Attorney attempts to delineate the subject 
of inquiry before Judge Jones. The copy of complaint 
attached to the bill of particulars (R. 15) is referred 
to in the proceedings as a "John Doe Complaint" and 
was never filed or made of record. (R. 108-109) The bill 
of particulars, ·with complaint attached, is set forth in 
Schedule G of the appendices. 
The deposition of the defendant taken bt:~fore Judge 
Jones (Exhibit 2) was never offered to the defendant 
for signature or correction and he never delivered the 
3 
,ame to any one within the concept of Section 76-45-6, 
i'tah Code Annotated, 1953. (R. 118) 
The questions and answers contained in the indict-
rnPnt in some respects are taken out of context. Para-
~raph 3 of the bill of particulars states that all of the 
~ulJject matter of the indictment "is material to the 
charge set forth" in the "John Doe Complaint." De-
mands for a further bill of particulars were rejected 
and a motion to quash the indictment was denied. 
The indictment is silent as to the subject of inquiry 
and gives no indication as to materiality. Judge Jones 
inquired directly on the question of bribery, but the 
indictment does not charge perjury in connection with 
the negation of the same. 
"Q. ln relation to these leases, Mr. Brady did 
anyone ever approach you and off er you any 
sort of bribe in relation to them' 
A. No, Judge, nobody ever approached me on a 
bribe." (Exhibit 2, p. 31, 1. 25-28, R. 154) 
The preamble of the deposition states, in part: 
"THE COURT: What we're doing, Mr. Brady 
and Mr. Nielsen, is proceeding under Title 77 of 
the Utah Code. It provides that * * * a John 
Doe Complaint may be signed and* * *to proceed 
with the depositions of other persons to see if 
there is any gTolmds for having it actually issued, 
* * *. First of all, there was Hugh Nielsen. The 
second individual was Neuman Petty. We've also 
had Boyd N erdin in, and this morning, rred New-
som was here. 
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* * * 
Our principal area will involve the bit paver anrl 
the history on both sides of it, plus ·what would 
appear to be related facts. "' * *" (Exhibit 2 
Pages 2-3, R. 127-128) ' 
The trial judge permitted the jury to speculate not 
only as to what was in the minds of the Grand .Juror~, 
but also as to what ·was in the mind of Judge Jones, sa111 
testimony. (Instruction No. 6). 
The leasing of the bit paver by the Salt Lake County 
C01mnission during the month of September, 1963 and 
other transactions will be pointed up in the argument 
pertaining to our claim of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Ver· 
diet of the Jury and the Motion for a Directed 
Verdict of Not Guilty Should Have Been Granted. 
It is contended that the quantitative evidence rule 
precludes proof of falsity by circumstantial evidence 
alone. The rule is stated in the annotation, 88 A.L.H. 2d 
859, as follows: 
"Thus, in a number of cases it has been expressly 
held or stated that falsity of testimony alleged 
to be perjurious must be established by direct owl 
positive testimony of two witnesses or onr wit11es,, 
and corrolJorating circumstances, and that cir-
cumstantial evidence alone is never sufficient." 
(Emphasis added) 
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See also Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 
o±S, 89 L.Ed. 495 ( 1945) ; United States v. Remington, 
\91 F .2d 246, (2nd Cir., 1951) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907, 
i~ S.Ct. 580, 9G L.Ed. 1325, and 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, 
Sec. 67, Page 37. 
We analyze the various issues as submitted to the 
.iury by Instruction No. 6, in sequence and under head-
ings as follows : 
A. THE TESTING OF THE BIT PAVER 
The questions and answers in this regard were as 
follows: 
"Q. After you returned to Salt Lake, and before 
you were informed that Midvale Motors had 
purchased this machine, was the County test-
ing this machine 7 
A. You bet, we were. 
Q. And were any reports submitted to you as 
to the result of the tests 7 
A. Mr. N erdin contacted me quite frequently 
and I went out to the scene quite frequently 
to see the tests." (Exhibit 2, p. 15, 1. 17-24) 
The indictment omits the italicized letter "I," which 
was inserted by the trial judge. There is no evidence in 
the record as to whether the defendant did or did not 
go to the scene "quite frequently" or otherwise. The in-
sertion of the word "I" is consistent, however, with the 
nnsigned deposition of the defendant. The State did 
not challenge the testimony that the defendant went to 
the scene to see the tests nor did the State adduce any 
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testimony to challenge the statement that ''Mr. Nerdin 
contacted me quite frequently." The bill of particulars 
concedes that the bit paver was tested: 
"The testing consisted of two days only - on 11 1 
about August 13, 19G3 and on or about Augu8t 
17, 1963." 
This begs the question as to whether the testimony 
as given by the defendant was false. The trial judg~ 
put words in the defendant's mouth that he did not utter 
by Instruction No. 6, 2A, the preamble of which reads: 
"That C. \V. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by 
Mr. Brady to lead Judge Jones to understand 
that Salt Lake County tested the 'bit paver' befon: , 
leasing it substantially more exclusive than it 
was in fact so tested * * *." 
The Grand Jury by its indictment did not sub-
scribe to the connotation of "extensive testing." It even 
omitted the subject of inquiry in its indictment. It was 
the District Attorney who authored the idea and the 
trial judge elaborated by the words: "substantially more 
* * * than it was in fact so tested." Regardless of the 
rustortion of the defendant's testimony, there was no 
evidence that the same was false, there was no showing 
that the defendant rud not go to the scene of the tests, 
and there was no showing that N erdin did not contact 
the defendant. The evidence affirmativd.v shows that 
tests were conducted while the machine was owned hy 
Bonneville Equip1rn•nt Company. (R. 210) Tlw sale of the 
bit paver to Midvale J\fotors was August 27, 1963. (R. 
179) The letter from Hubert H. Nielsen, President of 
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Bonneville Equipment Company dated August 24, 1963 
1Exhibit 5) states in part as follows: 
''In line with the results of the past 36 days rela-
tive to the performance of the Tanco Bit Paver, 
this machine has concluded its' test pattern at 
:1200 West by putting down a seal coat of 'Black 
Beauty Slag' and US-2 Bitumen that is unequalled 
in the State of Utah." 
It is submitted that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a verdict of guilty in connection with the ques-
tions and answers under subsection A of Instruction 
No. 6 and that the motion for a directed verdict with 
respect thereto (R. 297-300) should have been granted. 
B. THE USE OF THE BIT PA VER UP TO 
CHRISTMASTIME. 
The questions and answers in this regard were as 
follows: 
"Q. Are you aware of the fact that the machine 
was not used at all during January and Feb-
ruary and part of December~ 
A. As I recall, the machine was used, and I think 
we used it in the Chesterfield area, and I 
think we used the machine right up until 
Christmas. 
* * * 
Q. Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn back in 
Indiana discussing the fact that they put their 
machine away from Labor Day until May~ 
A. No, I do not. We used this machine up until 
December, I'm sure, right until Christmas-
time." (Exhibit 2, p. 21, 1. 6-22) 
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The ·words "As I recall," "I think w0 used it in thi: 
Chesterfield area," ''I think we used the machine rigltt 
up until Christmastime," when fairly considered in con-
nection with all of the testimony of the defendant, c1ualify, 
explain and erode away the assertion "\Ve used thii 
machine up until December, I'm sure, right until Chri~t­
mastime." 
The questions and answers are taken out of con-
text when viewed in the light of the entire deposition. 
Preceding the question first above, Mr. Brady was asked: 
"Q. If l\fr. Nerdin's record that the machine was 
used during September, October, November 
and part of December, would you accept this 
as being pretty accurate~ 
A. Yes, I would." (Exhibit 2, p. 20, 1. 24-27) 
It is clear that Mr. Brady was not testifying of his 
own knowledge as to the use of the bit paver. He made 
it obvious to Judge Jones that l\Ir. Nerdin's record as 
to the use of the machine would be the best evidence. 
Judge Jones stated in his introductory comments in the 
deposition that he had previously deposed N erdin. 
The net effect of taking the testimony before Judge 
Jones out of context is to give the impression that the 
defendant was testifying as to his own knowledge. l\Ir. 
Brady made it obvious to .Judge Jones that his recollec-
tion was subordinate to the record. Judge Jones, by 
his question, implied that N erdin had a record showing 
that the machine was used during "part of December." 
There was no effort made on the part of the State to 
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,how that the defendant did not honestly believe that 
the machine had been used up until Christmastime. 
'rhe elements of falsity, deliberation and willful-
ill'SS are all dissipated by the answer to the effect that 
the witness would subscribe to whatever the record 
~ho wed, as that question was put to him by Judge Jones. 
Tlw annotation, G6 A.L.R. 2d 792 states in part: 
"lt has in many instances been held, or stated 
as a general proposition, that perjury cannot be 
assigned upon a statement which is merely an 
Pxpression of belief or opinion. Such holdings 
and statements are subject, however, to the quali-
fication that a charge of perjury or false swear-
ing may be based on a statement under oath as, 
or embodying, a matter of belief or opinion· 
where such belief or opinion is not in fact held 
or entertained." 
The trial court in ruling upon the motion for a 
directed verdict in this regard stated that "The testi-
mony is circumstantial only that he knew it." (R. 299) 
When the defendant was asked if he would accept N er-
din's record "as being pretty accurate" and having an-
swered in the affirmative, then the defendant's state of 
mind became inconsequential. Under the quantitative 
rule, however, the State had the burden to prove the 
alleged falsity of the state of mind or opinion by more 
than circumstantial evidence. 
What Judge Jones meant by his reference to "Mr. 
N erdin's record" is not revealed. No record by that 
name was produced. A bookkeeper, Joe Riccardi, pre-
pared State's Exhibit 21, which was received in evidence 
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over the objection of the defendant. (R. 237) The ex-
hibit purports to be a summary made by the witness 
from documents relating to materials used by the bit 
paver. (R. 235) The exhibit was calculated to show suh-
stantially when the bit paver ·was last used in the cal-
endar year 19G3. On voir dire, the witness revealed 
that he did not have the basic documents in his posses-
sion and that they were last seen in the custody of thP 
Grand Jury. (R. 23G) The court admitted the exhibii 
over objection, but stated to the District Attorney "even-
tually I want you to produce" the documents. (R. 237) 
The documents were never produced and as a conse-
quence, cross-examination of the witness on the subject 
was aborted. The same objection, the same rule and 
the same voir dire questions apply to State's Exhibit 2~, 
the summary of alleged daily reports of chips spread 
for 1964. (R. 240) The base documents were never pro-
duced. Exhibit 20, purporting to be a summary of parts 
purchased for repairs on the bit paver and of supplies 
furnished was also received in evidence over objection, 
with the court ordering basic documents to be produced, 
which was never complied with. (R. 242) 
The rule is well stated in :20 Am. Jur., Euirlcucr. 
Section 449, Page 400: 
"To render a summary of voluminous records 
prepared by an (~xpert ~drnissible in evidence, the 
competency of the reeords tl!Pmselves as evidence 
must have beE'n establislwd and the records mnst 
further be made available to the opposite party 
for the purpose of cross-examination." 
11 
'11he witness Van Ausdal, testifying for the State, 
i !aid that operations with the bit paver in the Chester-
! rield area stopped "just before Thanksgiving" on ac-
r·ount of mechanical difficulty. (R. 211) The State's wit-
ue~s 'l'hayne, who had the overall responsibility for the 
, pt>rntion of the hit pawr (H. 222), testified that the 
1rnrk in the Chesterfield area with the bit paver termi-
nated around the 15th or the 20th of November, 1963 
1R. 220); that the wheel on the machine broke and that 
it was taken back to the shop approximately ten days 
later. (R. 221) When asked who, besides himself, would 
\Jave any knowledge of the fact that the machine had been 
returned, he answered: "I don't know of anybody. T 
don't recall telling anyone." (R. 227) 
The uncertain testimony of the witnesses Van Aus-
dal and Thayne as to the cessation of work in the 
Chesterfield area and the removal of the bit paver to 
the county shops points up the prejudicial effect of 
not having the advantage of the documents from which 
Riccardi made his compilations. There can be no justi-
fieation for the absence of the documents at the trial 
of the case in light of the testimony that they had been 
exhibited to the Grand Jury. 
The answers to the questions under this subsection 
of Instruction No. 6 cannot be tortured into the concept 
of a willful, deliberate falsehood. The evidence is not 
"ufficient to support the verdict and the motion for a 
rlin~ch'd verdict in favor of the defendant should have 
lwen granted. vVe submit that reasonable minds could 
not differ. 
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C. THE TAKING OF 'l'HI~ BIT PAVER TO THE 
SHOPS IN .JANlTAl{Y FROM CHESTER-
FIELD. 
The question and answer in this regard is as follows: 
"Q. Did 1\I r. N erdin ever inform you that thr.' 
machine was sitting idle during Jan nary 1 
A. Oh, I lrnFw the machine was - as a matter 
of fact, at that time we used it, like I say, up 
until December, and the weather moved in, 
and we was hoping to get the project com-
pleted in Chesterfield, and we left the ma-
chine in Chesterfield. And then ·we had to 
take it from Chesterfield back out to the shop, 
and this was sometime in January. We had 
to get the machine out of there." (Exhibit 2, 
p. 22, 1. 1-9) 
Much that we have said with respect to the Sub-
section B above is applicable to this subsection. Both 
the question and answer have their idiosyncrasies and 
are taken out of context. For example, the question as 
to whether Mr. N erdin informed J\f r. Brady that the 
machine was sitting idle during January was not an-
swered. Characteristic of many witnesses, Mr. Brady 
volunteered that the machine had to be taken from Ches-
terfield back to the Shop because of weather conditions 
even though they had hoped to get the project completed. 
It is conceded by everyone that the machine re-
mained idle at the County Shops from and including the 
month of January 19G-± until June of that year when 
a new lease was entered into, and all without any expense 
13 
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I to the County, except perhaps small repairs. The trial 
\ court, however, in its preamble to the question and an-
! ower in this subsection (Instruction No. 6) stated: 
"That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated 
by l\Ir. Brady Jr. to lead Judge Jones to under-
stand that the bit paver was not placed in the 
Salt Lake County shop yard till substantially 
later than it was in fact so placed * * * ." 
The materiality of whether the bit paver was re-
turned to the shops in January because of weather or 
otlwr conditions is centered around the concept of the 
cancellable provisions of the lease of the machinery. 
The lease (Exhibit 4) is dated September 25, 1963 and 
is for a term of five consecutive months, commencing 
on the 23rd day of August, 1963 and ending on the 22nd 
day of Febriwry, 1964. The italicized portion, the date 
of February 22, 1964 is an obvious error. Five consecu-
tive months from the 23rd day of August, 1963 would 
make the termination date the 23rd day of January, 1964. 
The last rental payment of $4,000.00 was due on the 
22nd day of December, 1963. The lease would have 
had to have been cancelled prior to the 22nd day of De-
cember in order to save the last monthly payment. 
The testimony is uncertain as to the precise date 
\\'hen the machine broke down in the Chesterfield area, 
hut it is clear from the testimony of both Thayne and 
Van Ausdal that the lease could not have been cancelled 
in time to save the $4,000.00 payment due November 
22, 1963. Any fair eonsideration of all of the surround-
ing circumstances, including a possible "break" in the 
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weather, permitting the renewed operation of the 11w 
chine would lead to the conclusion that it would be un-
reasonable to have ex1wcted l\f r. Brady as tlw lwad of 
the department, to have brought a11out the cancellation 
of the lease to save the payment due December 23, 19G3. 
Assuming the exactitude of prudent supervision and 
being able to forecast the vagaries of weather dnring 
the forepart of December, 19G:3 making the operation of 
the machine impossible, and giving some reasonable 
tolerance to arrive at the conclusion and to set in motion 
the paperwork incident to cancellation, there is still 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Brady could have cancelled 
the lease to save the December payment. It is obvious, 
however, that Judge Jones did not have the December 
payment in mind when he quPri<"d tlw defendant. He 
was misled in the belief that the lease could have been 
cancelled in January to save the last month's payment. 
During the deposition, Judge Jones asked Mr. Brady 
the following: 
"Q. Could you haw~ n•asonahly anticipated using 
it during January and February? 
A. No, no, I don't think so. Not unless the 
weather would have really been opened and 
the temperature been up we may have been 
able to use it. 
Q. Was there any reason then for not cancelling 
the lease as provided in the lease? 
A. No, probably an ovPrnight was all." (Ex-
hibit 2, p. 22, 1. 10-17) 
15 
~l r. Brady was forthright in his response to Judge 
,Jones and there was no evasion of the thrust of the 
im1uiry. If the defendant had answered that Nerdin's 
n·<·nrds were the best evidence instead of guessing at 
thL· situation, as he obviously did, he would still have 
i1•vpaled the possible oversight in not having cancelled 
tiw lease. If the physical operations of the bit paver 
had CL~ased prior to or on or about Thanksgivingtime, 
the witness would still have revealed the oversight in 
not having cancelled the lease. 
'This rPnCTPl'S antielimactic as to whether the bit 
pa,Ter was taken back to the shop at Christmastime or 
in January and most certainly no fair minded man could 
·my that there was a willful intent to deceive. There is 
no evidence sufficient for the jury to the effect that 
111'. Brady knew that the machine had been returned to 
the shop, and particularly in light of the testimony of 
the State's witness Thayne to the effect that he, as 
the foreman, told no one of the incident. 
Judge Jones in a question following within an in-
terval of four questions clearly indicates his misinterpre-
tation of the lease when he asked the witness: 
"Q. Excuse me, Isn't it a fact that the bit paver 
remained on the County or at the County 
shops between the expiration of the first lease 
which was in February, and the signing of 
the second lease which was in June of 19641 
A. It did, yes." (Exhibit 2, p. 22-23, 1. 29-3) 
It is clear that there was no intent to deceive nor 
was tltt> question or the answer material. Both Judge 
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Jones and the trial court miscom;trued the lease, as the 
last rental payment wm; dne on December 23, 1963 and 
there ,,-as no further iia.y1m·nt due during the month of 
.January, 19G-l- or February of t!tat year. Tht'l'(· 1xa: 
no issue that eould prnpt·dy havv lw<·n suhmitt<•d to tli1· 
jury premised upon thE~ question and answer in this snlJ-
section of Instrnction No. 6. 
D. OTHER PROPERTY LEASED BY THE 
COUNTY. 
The question and answn in this regard is as followo: 
"Q. \Vhat other type of equipment have you leased 
in the past for the county~ (Emphasis added) 
A. I think we leased a garbage packer or two of 
them through the Purchm;ing Department. I 
think we also and are presently lt>asing frorn 
- well, you can check the name. It would 
be in the records. Leasing some sweepers." 
(Exhibit 2, p. 29, 1. 16-22) 
The State contends that the perjury consists of the 
fact that Mr. Brady did not reveal in answer to the 
question propounded that Commissioner Jensen on May 
15, 1963 had leased an Allis-Chalmers crawler tractor for 
Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges from Motor Lease, 
Inc. through Ted Newsom, manager, (Exhibit 18) and 
thereafter on the 15th day of June, 1963 leased the same 
tractor for Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges from 
the same lessor for a period of two years, ending on the 
14th day of June, 1965. (Exhibit 19) The first lease for 
the period of one month was for the sum of $3,000.00, 
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payablP in advance, and the second lease was for the 
~urn of $3,000.00 per month for the first six months and 
the remaining eighteen months at $1,880.00 per month. 
:llr. Brady had nothing to do with either lease and so 
far as the record is concerned, knew nothing about the 
transactions. 
'rl1e language ''what other type of equipment" ex-
dudPs the type of equipment previously the subject of 
im1uiry by Judge Jones, such as the bit paver and con-
~eivahly all heavy equipment. The question uses the word 
"you" and excludes Commissioner Jensen and all other 
individuals leasing or purchasing property for the coun-
ty. 
The question is inarticulate, ambiguous and mislead-
ing, particularly in light of the claim that the defendant 
should have included the Allis-Chalmers tractor leased 
by Commissioner .Jensen \vithin the response that was 
lllade. 'l'he ::)tate stretches the imagination to the breaking 
point when it contends that the responsive reply should 
have included the heavy piece of etjuipment called the 
Allis-Chalmers tractor, covered by a lease that the de-
fendant neither krn='W about nor was connected with as a 
participant. 
The trial judge puts this strained construction on 
the question and the answer by the preface to this por-
tion of the instruction, which reads as follows: 
''That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words calculated by 
.Mr. Brady to lead Judge Jones to understand 
that no other lease of such equipment was in ef-
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feet -with, or through TPd K <:'\\-s0111 01· any corn-
pany represented b>- him when in fact ~ leasP 
existed on an Alas-Chalmers tractor ~- * ''. '' 
The trial court ignored the fact that the Allis-Chai 
mers tractor was the subject of a leasp participated in by 
Commissioner Jensen for Salt Lake County, and the 
fact that there was no lease of that particular equipment 
that the defendant ,,-as a part.\- to .. Judge Jones was in-
quiring concerning tlw direct and personal activities of 
the defendant with reference to the subject matter. This 
is made crystal clear by the qm·stions and answers im-
mediately preceding the question and answer, the sub-
ject of the instruction. 
"Q. As the Commissioner in charge of Bridges 
and Roads for the County, have you in thP 
past had an occasion to negotiate several 
leases? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. :B'or special equipment such as a bit paver, 
specialized equipment such as a bit paver1 
A. No. I think that's the only piece of specialized 
equipment that I ever leased." (Exhibit 2, 
p. 29, 1. 8-17) 
There is nothing in the deposition taken before Judge 
Jones or in the indictment or in the bill of particulars 
that refers to an Allis-Chalmers tractor. There was no 
formal charge> a11prising the ddenclant of the naturr 
of the charge against him so far as the subject of in· 
quiry was concerned, and in particular, the lease of the 
Allis-Chalmers tractor. 
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To comvound the error, State's Exhibit No. 15 was 
a!httitkd owr the objeetion of the defendant during the 
, :\arnination or Cornrnissimwr .h•nsen and read in part to 
th(' jury. (R. 270-271) The exhibit purports to be a re-
production of a document, not sig1wd by, for, or on behalf 
of Salt Lake County. rrhe document is dated the 17th day 
of ~I ay, 196-± and covers the same Allis-Chahners tractor 
a~ described in Exhibit 18. 
'rhe obvious purvose of the State Attorney was to 
(·rPak the impression before the jury that the defendant 
had in fact leased the Allis-Chalmers equipment on be-
half of the County from Motor Lease, Inc. This erron-
eous impression, with the aid of the trial court, and over 
objection, was to the prejudice of the defendant. Ex-
hibit 15 was inadmissible on its face. It is an unsigned 
rq1l'oduction of an instrument concerning which no foun-
dation was laid as to the whereabouts of the original 
document or that either the original or the exhibit itself 
t'Ver had any vitality as a commitment binding upon 
Salt Lake County. Defendant's struggle to keep out the 
obvious]>- inflammatory and prejudicial exhibit and the 
conversations with respect thereto was futile. (R. 265-
270) On cross-examination, Commissioner Jensen ad-
mitted that Exhibit 15 was not presented to him by Mr. 
Brady; that it was presented by Mr. Borg, the purchasing 
agent (R. 275) ; that Exhibit 15 was never executed by 
Salt Lake County; that it never became a lease; that it 
JH•wr had any vitality as a contractual document; that it 
dot's not mean anything except a piece of paper so far 
, a~ a contractual commitment is concerned. (R. 276) 
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Commissioner Jensen conceded Exhibit 18 to be a 
lease for the same e<1uipment; that it was executed by 
him as Commissioner in charge of the Purchasing De-
partment; that it did not go through the Commission and 
that it was not submitted to him by .l\lr. Brady. Commis-
sioner Jensen did not recall whether the lease, Exhibit 
18, was presented to him by the purchasing agent, .Mr. 
Borg, or by l\ir. N e'.vsoui. Then, on cross-examination, 
stated that he (Jensen) did not say anything to Mr. , 
Brady about the lease dated the 15th day of May, 1963. 
(R. 277) 
By way of summary, the closest that the State got in 
its efforts to prove perjury in connection with the Allis-
Chalmers equipment was that Mr. Brady had somewhat 
of a caustic conversation with Commissioner Jensen over 
a proposed lease submitted by someone other than Mr. 
Brady, probably the purchasing agent, and which lease 
was never consummated. The lease of the Allis-Chalmers 
equipment was negotiated and consummated by Com-
missioner Jensen and there is nothing in the record to 
show that Brady had any knowledge of the transaction, 
Commissioner Jensen did not advise Mr. Brady, and the 
minutes of the County Commission do not reveal the 
transaction. It must be assumed, therefore, that :Mr. 
Brady did not know of the leasing of the equipment, and 
most certainly, the proof does not square up with Judge 
Jones' question: "vVhat other type of equipment have 
yoii leased in the past for the county~" The motion for a 
directed verdict in this n·spect should have been granted. 
21 
II. Other Prejudicial Evidence Admitted During the 
Trial Over the Objection of Appellant. 
1. DURING THE TESTlMONY OF JUDGE 
,JON 1£S. 
Jndge Jones identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as a 
ear hon copy of the so-called "John Doe" complaint signed 
before him by Delmar L. Larson on the 22nd day of 
;\pril, 1965. The witness did not know where the ribbon 
copy of the document was and stated that he did not be-
lieve it was given a file number. The carbon copy, along 
11ith the original copy, was left by the witness in the 
County Attorney's office and not afterwards seen by 
him. (R. 108-109) ·when the Exhibit was offered, there 
was an objection made, and the following occurred: 
"Q. (By l\fr. Banks) I will show you a file in 
this case. Attached to one of the Defendant's 
pleadings is a photo copy marked Exhibit B. 
I will ask you if you can identify what that 
purports to be. 
* * * 
A. This appears to be a photo of the amended 
John Dor complaint, which this is a copy of. 
MR. GUSTIN: I move to strike that term 
"amen de d John Doe Complaint" on the 
ground that it is an improper conclusion by 
this witness. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The 
jury may make such, I think they will be able 
to understand ·what the situation is. I trust 
the common sense of the jury on this matter." 
(R. 109-110) 
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Throughout the trial, the trial judge left matters 
of law on objections as to relevancy, materiality and com-
petency to "the common sense of the jury". In this in-
stance, however, the above reference by Mr. Banks was 
to a photocopy marked Exhibit B "attached to Defen-
dant's Objections to Bill of Particulars as Furnished an<l 
Request for a Supplemental Bill of Particulars." (R. 21) 
The Exhibit B, so attached, was <~xhibited to the witness 
and he then characterized it as "a photo of the amended 
John Doe complaint, * '~ *". The handwritten additions 
and deletions a]Jpearing on Exhibit B are in the hand-
writing of Judge Jones (R. 110) and were made after 
the 7th day of May, 1965, the time of the deposition of the 
defendant Brady and after the 22nd day of April, 1965, 
the date that Delmar L. Larson signed Exhibit 1. 
Judge Jones characteriZ":ed his scribblings as being 
the "amended complaint". The document with the hand-
written scribblings was never filed and while the witness 
deleted the names John Doe, Jam es Doe and Richard Doe, 
and substituted the name of Theodore M. Newsom, the 
implication that the document was an "amended com-
plaint" as affecting Mr. Brady, or anyone other than 
Newsom, is clearly erroneous. The trial jury was not 
shown Exhibit B referred to as being attached to one of 
the defendant's pleadings, so that it did not have even 
an inkling as to the true facts of the situation, merely 
the conclusion of J uclge .Jones that the "John Doe" com-
plaint had been amended. The motion to strike the term 
"amended John Doe Complaint" on the ground that it 
was an improper conclusion by the witness should obvi-
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onsly have been granted. The prejudicial effect in not 
~ranting the motion is obvious. The trial court, however, 
was not content with rnerely denying the motion, but 
added: 
"'The jury may make such, and I think they will 
be able to understand >vhat the situation is. I trust 
the common sense of the jury on this matter.:' 
(R 110) 
A rather thorny legal problem was thus delegated to 
the jury. Furthermore, a community of interest between 
the trial court and the jury was established and peculiarly 
~olidified when l~xhibit No. 1, after having been read to 
the jury by the District Attorney, was ordered handed to 
the jury by the court with the comment: 
"Hand it to the jurors so they can pass it among 
themselves to see the general nature of the instru-
ment. You may continue." (R. 111-112) 
Exhibit No. 1 purports to charge "the attempted 
hrihery of an ext'cutive officer." It had no probative 
value so far as the instant action is concerned and it was 
infla11m1ator)'. lts onl>· purpose was to establish the right, 
if any, on the part of Judge Jones to depose Mr. Brady. 
This was a legal problem and not one for the jury. 
-> DURINO THE rrES'l1IMONY OF THE WIT-
~11JNS NIELSEN. 
Nielsen was identified with Bonneville Equipment 
, Company, the concern that sold the bit paver to Motor 
Lease, the company with which Ted Newsom was identi-
fiPd. Tht' defrndant in his deposition taken before Judge 
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Jones acknowledged having lea8ed the bit paver from 
Motor Lease. The lease>, Exhibit -!, signed by Commis-
sioner Cannon on behalf of Salt Lake County, was the 
end point of the lease negotiatimrn. Nielsen, however, was 
asked several quc>stions as to conversations with Boyd 
N erdin, the Superintendent of Hoads and Bridges, and 
with Newsom, all out of the presence of defendant Brady. 
The objection to each of the qnc>stions on the grounds of 
hearsay was overruled and ('ach answer by the witnes~ 
resulted in infla111111atory and eollatPral rnattern. By \\'ay 
of example, Nielsen was asked: 
"Q. Did you negotiate with anyone from Salt 
Lake County with reference to the purchase 
of this machine." (R. 161) 
Over objection as to materiality and as being beyond 
the issues in this case (the District Attorney knew that 
there were no negotiations for the purchase of this ma-
chine) the witness stated that he contacted Boyd Nerdin, 
Superintendent of Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges. 
The witness was thrn asked concerning a conversation 
with N erdin, which ·was objected to as being hearsay and 
·which was ovPnnled on the stated ground: 
"Res gestae, business trairnaction. He may answPr 
as to this. The hearsay rule does not have applica-
tion, continue." (R 161) 
The answer was that the witness asked if he, Nerdin, 
would talk to Mr. Brady "about getting some interest in 
the machine, to purchase it". ( R. 163) A subsequent con-
versation with N erdin developed the answer: 
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"A. l\Ir. Nerdin said that he had talked with Mr. 
Brady about it, but he said that he says there 
is another man that is closer to Mr. Brady 
than anybody, whom I suggest that you talk 
to." (R. 164) 
On a motion to t:>trike, which was overruled, the court 
stated: 
"I believe the jury can handle this type of testi-
mony, continue." 
'J1he witness then testified: 
"A. \Vdl, he said, 'I suggest that you talk to him, 
Ted Newsom appeared in court, he said 'I 
think he might be able to help you on this 
type of thing.' He is Mr. Brady's guberna-
torial campaign manager and handled his af-
fairs on anything that might reflect upon 
him." (R. 164-165) 
'rhe motion to strike the answer of the witness on 
the ground that it was inflammatory, prejudicial, hearsay 
and immaterial was denied and the trial court made the 
gratuitous but ambiguous statement: 
"I believe that it is a matter for the jury as to 
whether or not this is part of the way the business 
was done, or whether it was not, and whether it 
occurred, or whether it didn't occur, is immaterial 
for the jury to decide." (R. 165) 
Counsel for the State did not ask in good faith con-
eeming a transaction with reference to the "purchase" 
of the bit paver, but was interested only in getting be-
fore the jury by innuendo and hearsay that the defendant 
had suggested that Nielsen do business with a third 
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party and the alleged political ambitions of Brady to run 
for governor and identifying Ted N e\vsom as his alleged 
campaign manager. This was not only the rankest kind 
of hearsay and over-tlte-foneP g-o:-;sip, \\'ith nothing at all 
to do with any business transadion, but prejudicial. 
The error was compounded in still another objection 
which vrns overruled when the court passed on to the 
jury the responsibility of determining a legal point and 
then refused to admonish the jury that hearsay was not 
offered "for the truthfulness of it", the words used by 
the District Attorney. (R. 166) 
An unjustified statement of the trial court was made 
in the presence of the jury after overruling a motion to 
strike certain of the hearsay testimony of the witness 
Nielsen by the gratutious statement: 
"I believe it is an insult to the jury to quibble into 
this matter." (R. 163) 
The rapport between thr trial court and the jury had 
already been established beyond the normal course of 
things, as pointed out in connection \Vi th the "John Doe" 
complaint. The belittling or downgrading of counsel by 
the trial judge could not have had other than a detri-
mental effect. The motion to strike was addressed to the 
court and involved a legal point. The jury was in no way 
involved and the so-called connotation of "insult" was a 
problem for the trial court and not the jury. 
3. DURING rrIIE r11EsrrDfONY OF r:J'HE WIT 
NESS RUSSELL. 
27 
J olm K. Russell was an accountant for Motor Lease 
and a previous employee of Petty Ford Company. (R. 
205) The witness was asked to give the name of the 
majority stockholder of Midvale Motors. The question 
1rns objected to on the ground that it was immaterial 
and irrelevant. The trial court in overruling the objection 
made the gratutious statement: 
"Answer the question and the jury will decide 
what is relevant in this matter." (R. 206) 
-1-. DCIUNU THJ£ TESTIMONY OF THE \VIT-
:rnss JENSI~N. 
The objection made to the testimony of the witness 
.Jensen with respect to Exhibit No. 15 which never ripen-
ed into a commitment on the part of Salt Lake County 
IR 2G5) and the assignment of misconduct on the part of 
the District Attorney (R. 267-269) is somewhat unique. 
Prior to trial, an order had been entered permitting the 
defendant a limited inspection of testimony given before 
the Grand Jury by the witness Jensen and others. (R. 
:50-32) Thus the defendant was alerted to certain mat-
ters occurring before the Grand Jury that had no com-
pet<mcy, relevancy, materiality or probative value upon 
the trial of the issues in the instant case. This included 
the reference to Exhibit No. 15 and to the purported con-
VPrsations elicited from the witness Jensen with the de-
fendant. (R. 267-269) Counsel for the State, in adhere-
ing to the modus operandi pursued before the Grand 
.Jm:-·, was peenliarl~. vnhwrnble in so doing to the charge 
of bad faith when the evidence so adduced at the trial 
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accomplished no more than to inflame the petit jury on 
extraneous matters to the prejudice of the defendant. The 
proceedings before the Grand Jury lose much of their 
glamour when vie\\-ed in the cold light of day and in this 
instance, the District Attorney ·was warned in advance 
that the testimony attempted to be elicited by Com-
missioner J ensm \rnuld be challenged on the grounds in-
dicated, as well as counsel's good faith. 
Commissioner Jensen did not testify to any relevant 
fact material to the issues herein involved. He was the 
one that negotiated the lease of the Allis-Chalmers trac-
tor and not the def end ant. Commissioner Jens en did not 
advise the defendant of the lease nor did he make it of 
record at any Commission meeting. The only purpose of 
his testimony was an ulterior one, that of getting before 
the jury, to the prejudice of the defendant, a purported 
conversation with reference to a proposed lease (Ex-
hibit 15) that was never consummated. 
5. SU1LMARY OF RULINGS ON EVIDENCE. 
The trial court, and to even a greater extent, the 
District Attorney, was aware of the inflammatory nature 
of collateral matters. ·while certain latitude is undoubted-
ly permissible to determine the materiality of the answers 
of witnesses in support of the charge of 1st degree per-
jury, nevertheless, a definite area of judicial circumspec-
tion was involved in order to insulate against erroneous 
impressions and erroneous conclusions. The hearsay in· 
jected into the record and indicated by the trial court as 
being a "part of the way the business was done", or 
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"just a verbal fad and business transaction", or the "res 
~l'stae" or "shop hook rule" was admissible, if at all, for 
a limited pmpose. \Ve submit that none of these rules 
apply. The conversations carried with them no business 
implication, but merely inflammatory collateral matters. 
JiJven in those instances where the exception to the 
hearsay rule is applicable, it is pointed out with unifor-
mity that the admissibility of evidence for a limited pur-
pmw involves ''certain risks'' in that the trier of fact 
might consider the evidence in relation to issues for which 
it would be inadmissible. In State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 
9± P. 987 ( 1908), the Court states: 
"In State v. Thorn1Json, 31 Utah 228, 87 Pac. 709, 
l\I r. Justice Straup, speaking for the court, says: 
'\Vhere evidence is received in a case which is ad-
missible only for a certain purpose, and is inad-
missible for other purposes to which the jury un-
aided may improperly apply it, it is essential that 
the court should correctly instruct them as to the 
purpose for which they may consider the evi-
dence'." 
Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 14, Page 
303 (3rd Edition) states: 
wrhe time for determining the admissibility of n. 
}Jarticular fact is ordinarily the time when it is 
offered to the Coitrt." 
It will be recalled that the trial court refused to 
forthwith instruct the jury that the truthfulness of the 
NPwsoru statement to the witness Nielsen was not an 
issue in light of the District Attorney's express state-
ment in that regard. (R. 166) 
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The statements attributable to the defendant by Com-
missioner Jensen could not i10ssibly come within the 
holding of this court in State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 
P.2d 1053 (1953) where the testimony of the bus driver 
that the defendant threatened him, saying: "Keep mov-
ing. I just shot a man." was held admissible as an admis-
sion against interest, citing Wignwre on Evidence, 3rd 
Edition, Section 10 and Sections 1048 and 1049. With 
Commissioner Jensen's statement, however, the claim is 
made that the testimony was elicited in bad faith because 
the District Attorney, in his contact with the Grand Jury 
knew that the defendant had not leased the Allis-Chal-
mers tractor. 
The other facet of the Neal case in its reference to 
Wigmore on Evidence is under the rule of res gestae, 
which clearly is not appEcable here. As pointed out above, 
the conversations with the third parties were not in 
connection with any extemporaneous or even remote 
overt act chargeable to the defendant within the issues of 
the case. 
Justice Wolfe in Sfote v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 
1016 (1947) comments on the hearsay rule, as follows: 
"But in the common law there were developed cer-
tain exceptions to that basic rule, for example, 
the hearsay rule, which made certain evidence, 
though relevant and material, incompetent. That 
was because of the danger of prejudice to the 
party against whom it ·was offered who would 
have no chance to cross-examine the source, or the 
probative value of the evidence offered was small 
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as compared to the great prejudicial affect it 
might have." 
Yimved in light of the hearsay testimony as having 
little, if any, probative value, it became incumbent upon 
the trial judge to determine whether the same might be 
misused by the triers of fact and to apply the rule cred-
ited to Justice Cardozo in Shepard v. United States, 290 
U.S. 96, 54 S.Gt. 22, 78 L.Ed.196 (1933), that: 
"-When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset 
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out." 
The practicalities of attempting to have a jury of 
la)·rnen screen from the evidence that which is relevant 
from that which is not is pointed up by Justice Cardozo 
in Shepard v. United States, supra, by the following: 
"Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the 
compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating 
clang of those accusatory words would drown all 
weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not 
for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are 
framed. They have their source very often in 
considerations of administrative convenience, of 
practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. 
vVhen the risk of confusion is so great as to upset 
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out." 
In K rnlewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 
ilG, 93 L.Ed. 790 (19±9) the hearsay statement of a co-
('Onspirntor ,,·as held inadmissible because made after the 
objectives of the conspiracy either had failed or had been 
achieved. The statement was not admissible having been 
rnadP in furtht'rance of an alleged implied, but uncharged, 
eonspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punish-
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ment. The importance of this decision in the instant case 
is the holding to the eff eet that error is presumed if "the 
Court is left in grave doubt as to whether the error had 
substantial influence in bringing about a verdict." And, 
the language of .Mr. Justice ,Jackson in his concurring 
opinion is equally important: 
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can 
be ove1·come by instructions to the jury ·· "' "", all 
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion." 
The rule was recently restated in Taylor v. Balti-
more & Ohio lfoilroacl Co., 3±± F.2d 281 (2nd Cir., 1965): 
"The basis for an inference of intimidation is ex-
tremely weak as against the danger that if the 
statement is admitted, the jury will use it substan-
tively regardless of what the judge may say. See 
. McCormick, supra S 39, at 77. 'When the risk of 
confusion is so great as to upset the balance of 
advantage, the evidence goe;:,; out.' " 
III. Instructions and Requested Instructions. 
Instruction No. 2 (R. 63-66) purports to instruct as 
to the "allegations of the indictment." This instruction 
is set forth in full in the appendices as Schedule D. There 
is nothing in the instruction exct'pt for the quoted qni:s-
tions and answers that is even remotely connected with 
the indictment. The instruction is centered around mat-
ters alleged to have occurred on or about the 2.'Jr,d day of 
Aitgust in 1963, which date is taken from the "John Doe" 
Complaint signed by Delmar Larson on April 22, 1965. 
The instruction quotes the charging part thereof includ-
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ing ''the atte1111ited bribing of an executive officer". The 
instruction attributes to the indictment evidentiary detail 
including the mentioning of the Allis-Chalmers tractor, 
concerning which both the indictment and the bill of par-
ticulars are silent 
The instruction credits the indictment as saying that 
Mr. Brady's answer omitting reference to the AllisJChal-
mers tractor "could logically lead Judge Jones to be-
lievt> l\f r. Newsom had no other lease with the County to 
lw enquired into, and that belief could logically mislead 
Judge Jones in his taking of testimony and in acting on 
Delmar Larson's allegations". There are other distortions 
of both the indictment and the testimony within the four 
corners of Instruction No. 2. 
The exception to Instruction No. 2 was upon the 
ground that the instruction does not set forth what the 
indictment charges, and in other respects it constitutes 
an "editorialization" on the indictment. (R 304) The trial 
judge not only improperly commented on the evidence 
and drew conclusions with respect thereto, but am.ended 
and supplemented the indictment. It was for the Grand 
Jury to articulate the charge. The indictment cannot be 
changed, amended or rewritten except by the grace of 
1-lc'ction 77-21--rn, l'tah Code Annotated, 1953. 
In State v. Myers, 5 Utah 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956), 
the statute just mentioned was held not to be applicable 
to matters of substance. The court stated: 
"As was stated by this court in the case of State 
v. Pettit, (97 Utah 443, 93 P.2d 675) 
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'The code of criminal procedure is not de-
signed to eliminate essential averments 
or to permit the pleading of misleading 
factual data, whether or not it was done 
knowingly.' 
The court in that case eonstrued 105-21-43, U.C.A. 
1943 (now 77-21-4-3, supra), to apply to variance, 
defects, or omissions that pertain to matters of 
form only rather than matters of substance." 
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) was 
objected to on the ground of prejudicial comment on the 
defendant's conduct. (R. 306) Of interest is the fact that 
the District Attorney took exception to the same portion 
of the Instruction (R. 301-302) as being an unwarranted 
comment on the entire conduct of the accused. He has not 
testified. The last paragraph of Instruction No. 15, after 
being interlined by the trial court reads : 
"Corroborative evidence may be circumstantial as 
well as direct and the entire conduct of the accused 
himself, both as a witness in his own behalf before 
a City Judge, and at times other than at the trial, 
as shown by the evidence, may be looked to for 
corroborative circumstances." (Emphasis added) 
The portion of the instruction objected to not only 
had the effect of emasculating the quantitative rule re-
ilating to proof of perjury, but it also was an unwar-
ranted and entirely improper invitation to speculate on 
matters that were not and could not conceivably have 
been of record. The word "conduct" connotes something 
different than the words spoken before Judge Jones. The 
words "as a witness in his own behalf" clearly imply that 
he was the accused before Judge Jones. Take this conno-
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tat ion and. apply it to Exhibit 1, the "John Doe" com-
plaint, and to Instruetion No. 2, which re-emphasizes "the 
attempted bribery of an executive officer", we have a 
,,ituation the equivalent of saying to the jury that the de-
fendant stood before Judge ,Jones accused of bribery. To 
this is added, tlw "L:omlnet'' of tlw accused "at times other 
than at the trial". This could conceivably mean the out-
ward expressions of the defendant to newspaper re-
port<·rs in the corridor of the courtroom. The speculation 
in thi;,; regard is not saved by the expression "as shown 
by the evidence". There is no evidence in the record as to 
the ''conduct" of the defendant, in or out of court. The 
defendant did not testify in the instant case, and the sug-
gestion as to his conduct "as a witness in his own be-
half", with or without the interlineation "before a City 
.Judge" is but an oblique adverse comment by the trial 
judge of the fact that he did not take the witness stand. 
The prejudice is apparent. 
Instruction No. 1-1 (R. 79) is inconsistent with the 
first paragraph of Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) and the 
second paragraph of Instruction No. 16 (R. 81) and was 
1•xcepkd to on the ground of such inconsistencies. (R 
305) Other exceptions to instructions were taken, as well 
as exceptions to requests made and not given and to re-
quests given as modified, but these matters in the light 
of the PlTOr specifically pointed out above are but cumu-
lative. Instruction No. 6, however, merits specific refer-
ence: on the ground that it is confusing and incomprehen-
sible and the exception to that effect. 
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Requested Instruction No. 2 (H. 47), which was re-
fused, should, under all of the circumstances of the case, 
have been given, particularly in light of the literary li-
cense indulged by the trial court in its instruction of the 
same number. The request reads as follows: 
"The Court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, 
that the indictment in this case is no evidence, in 
the slightest degree, but is a mere formal charge, 
requiring proof of all of the material allegations 
contained therein, by the testimony of witnesses, 
or by facts and circumstances. And you are fur-
ther instructed that the law presumes the defen-
dant to be innocent of the crime charged in the 
indictment, until he has been proven to be guilty 
beyond all reasonable doubt; and this presump-
tion of innocence i;:; no mere idle theory, to be cast 
aside by the jury through mere caprice, passion 
or prejudice, but it is a substantial part of the 
law of the land, and follows the defendant 
throughout the entirC' case, and must not be lost 
sight of by the jury until it has been overcome by 
evidence which «stablishes the defendant's guilt 
beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral cer-
tainty." 
In lieu of the foregoing, the court gave its Instruc-
tion No. 3, which reads: 
"You are instructed that the foregoing instruc-
tion is not to be regarded as a statement of facts 
proved in this case. But is to be considered merely 
as a summarized state>ment of the accusation 
against the defendant." (R. 66) 
Requested Instruction No. 3 (R. 48) on the quantita-
tive proof required incident to a perjury charge was re-
fused. This request should lw compared with the first 
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.11«> paragravhs of lnstnwtion No. 15 (R. 80) which in-
'! 1w t io:1 was r~ilntP(l lir·:, Oilfl eorni;n·L<·nsion by the refer-
l'JlCP io ddendant's conduct ns more particularly stated 
allOw. r:l'he requested instruction reads: 
"You are inst meted that the State must establish 
to your safo.;faction heyond a reasonable doubt 
the falsity of the defendant's sworn statements by 
direct and po~;itiw evidence. Direct and positive 
Pvidence is evidence of one or more witnesses who 
have actual knmYledg·e of the facts corroborated 
b~.r othC'l' independent circumstantial evidence. 
Should the State fail to sustain its burden in these 
imrticulars to your satisfaction beyond a reason-
abk~ doubt, then you cannot convict the defendant 
and he must be acquitted." 
IV. The Deposition Taken Before Judge Jones 
ShouM Have Been Suppressed. 
Defendant's motion to supress (R. 33-34) was over-
ruled and denied (R. 35) and was based upon grounds 
(1) the same grounds as urged in connection with the 
motion to quash the indictment; ( 2) the "John Doe" 
~ornplaint did not eharge a public offense, was never filed 
in the City Court, was rendered nugatory and made abor-
tive by Judge Jones, and all proceedings thereunder were 
extrnjudicial; ( 3) the complaint as s1vorn to by Delmar 
L. Larson did not eurnply with subparagraph 1 of Section 
17-11-1, l 'toh Code A1111,Jtatc.d, 1953; and ( 4) the pur-
ported deposition was never subscribed to by the defen-
dant, nor was he penni tted to correct the same, nor was 
it ddivercd to an:;, iwrson by him -vvith the intent that it 
he uttered or published as true. 
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As to the subparagraph 1 of 8ection 77-11-1, it is 
mandatory that the complaint name the person accused, 
if known, "or if not known and it is so stated" he may be 
designated by another name. Delmar L. Larson did not 
under oath in the so-called "J olm Doe" complaint state 
that the true name of a defendant was not known. The 
lack of such an allegation goes to the question of good 
faith at the grass roots of the entire proceeding. 
The bill of particulars states that Judge Jones "ac-
quired jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in 
said complaint" (John Doe Complaint) and proceeded to 
interrogate the defendant herein under the provisions 
of Section 77-11-3, Utah Co,de Annotated, 1953, which 
Section reads : 
"When a complaint is made before a magistrate 
charging a person with the commission of a crime 
or public offense, such magistrate must examine 
the complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge 
of the commission of the offense charged, and he 
may also examine any other persons and may 
take their depositions." 
The bill of particulars states that the interrogation, 
in question and answer form, was reported by a certified 
shorthand reporter and notary public and was reduced 
to writing. Mr. Brady did not sign or correct the so-called 
deposition, nor was it ever delivered by him to any 
person with the intent that it be uttered or published as 
true, as contemplated by Section 76-45-6, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, which reads: 
"The making of a deposition or certificate is deem-
ed to be complete, within the provisions of thi~ 
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C'ha1it<·r, frolll tlw time ·when it is delivered by the 
acrn:wcl to ::u1>- other person with the intent that 
it l1e uttered or published as true." 
H(•dion 71--+-+-'.2, r-tu!1 Cod.0 An11doted, 1953, makes 
tliP rules of evidence in civil actions applicable to crim-
inal actions, exce11t as otherwise provided in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Proccditrc, is to the effect that when the testimony is 
fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to 
the witness for examination, shall be read to or by him, 
and that he may make such corrections or changes upon 
the deposition, in form or in substance, as he desires. 
If perjury is to be based on what occurred before 
Judge Jones, it should be bottomed upon a deposition 
subscribed to by the defendant in the manner recognized 
hy rule and not otherwise. The indictment was fatally 
defective in this regard and in any event, the purported 
tleposition not so signed, subscribed, uttered and de-
livered should have been suppressed. 
V. The indictmeni is Fatally Defective. 
The motion to quash (R 23-24) which was denied by 
the trial court (R 27) is referred to here on the ground 
that tlw indictment does not charge the defendant with 
tlw commission of an offense, in that it does not inform 
of the nature and cause of the accusation and with re-
:-111ect to which there must be an identification of some 
i:.;sue or inquiry or subject matter in terms of which an 
initial judgment can lw made regarding the possible ma-
t<'riality of the all<•gt>dly false testimony recited in the 
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indictment. These matters were carefully considered by 
the court in State v. Popolos, 103 A.2d 511 (Maine, 1954), 
where the court, among other things, stated: 
"A respondent, or a court, cannot judge the rea-
sonable possibility of the materiality of the testi-
mony unless the indictment, on its face, identifip~ 
some specific issue, or subject matter, in relation 
to which the question of materiality is raised. * * ~ 
'The purpose is to allow for the formulation or 
identification of some issue, or inquiry, or subject 
matter in terms of which an initial judgment can 
be made regarding the possible materiality of the 
allegedly false testimony recited in the indictment. 
It is to enable the Court, by inspection of the in-
dictment alone, to conclude whether the testimony 
set forth and claimed to be false can have any 
reasonable possibility of materiality. If the indict-
ment on its face does not sufficiently identify the 
particular proceeding to which it is claimed the 
materiality of the alleged testimony relates, de-
fendant is deprived of a most imp o rt ant 
right***." 
The court cites State v. Webber, 78 Vt. 463, 62 A. 
1018, as a leading case "and one squarely in point". The 
Vermont case had to do with a streamlined statutory 
form of indictment in perjury cases, and held the indict-
ment to be fatally defective because neither count spe-
cified the subject matter of the investigation then being 
pursued by the Grand Jury. 
The court, in Popolos, supra, then concludes: 
"It is thus elear that an indictnH'nt for iwrjury 
even under a streamlined statutory form, must 
contain some designation or identification of the 
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particular matter l;eing investigated, or heard, by 
the trihunal involved. Such identification is en-
tirely lacking in the present indictment. The pro-
secutor has done no more than to show, in the 
most generic terms possible, that the Grand Jury 
was acting on a multitude of matters within its 
jurisdiction. In no manner has he undertaken to 
inform the respondent of any particularized or 
identifiable subject matter, within that general 
jurisdiction, by which the respondent or the court 
can evaluate, initially, the possibilty of the ma-
teriality of respondent's allegedly false testimony, 
or to give him information to prepare his defense. 
Neither can we comprehend how a respondent 
could plead former jeopardy under such a general 
allegation." 
The Colorado case of Treece v. People, 40 P.2d 233 
(193-t) is cited in State v. Popolos, supra. Objections were 
made at the beginning of the trial to the introduction of 
any testimony, and to the testimony of each witness. A 
motion for a directed verdict was made. The motion and 
all ohjectiom; IH".·e overruled by the trial court. The ob-
jections were made on the ground that the indictment was 
insnfficient to charge perjury in that it did not allege 
the subject or matter of the inquiry before the Grand 
.Jury at the time the defendant gave the alleged false 
testimony. The appellate court, in reversing, held that 
th<' objections were to matters of substance and not of 
form and therefore could be raised at any stage of the 
proceedings. 
In People v. Greenwell, 5 Utah 112, 13 P. 89 (1887), 
the indictment stated the fact claimed to be material to 
thP matter under investigation. In State v. Anderson, 35 
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Utah 496, 101 P. 385 (1909), the complaint before the 
magistrate set forth with a fair degree of particularity 
the issue of materiality. The Popolos case, supra, carrie~ 
this requirement into the present day streamlined mode 
of pleading. 
The District Attorney, by his bill of particulars, 
has stated that all of the matters set forth in the in-
dictment are not claimed to be false, and then he pre-
sumes to suggest the area of the allrged falsity, a mattl'r 
peculiarly within the province of the Grand Jury. 
Whether the District Attorney can presume to reflect 
the deliberations of the Grand Jury by the bill of par-
ticulars, he cannot, in any event, enlarge upon the in-
dictment or aid or assist the court in the determination 
of what may or may not be material. It was held in 
State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.2d 455 (1941) that 
the offense must be charged in the indictment or infor-
mation without reference to the bill of particulars and 
that if the information is indefinite as to the offense 
charged, the bill of particulars is of no help in deciding 
questions of the relevency of evidence. 
There is no criteria, no yardstick, for the trial judge 
to follow in the inevitable instruction to the jury or de-
termination as a matter of law the problem of what is 
or is not mat(~rial and therefore, the motion to quash 
should have been granted on that ground alone. 
CONCLUSION 
Perjury when in fact committed is a most repre-
hensible crime. More reprehensible, however, is the low-
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Pl'ing of judicial standards as a matter of expediency. 
ln this case, it was considered expedient by someone to 
bring about the political demise of an individual. That 
11·as accomplished. It remains for this court to apply 
tiim' honored rules and the unquestioned sern;e of justice 
and fair play to a situation in which the accumulation 
of enor is overwhelming. When the proceedings before 
J urlge .Jones are considered in their full context, every 
rms\vcr attributed to the defendant by the indictment 
will not support the charge of which he stands convicted. 
This court should reverse and dismiss the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harley W. Gustin 
GUSTIN & R:i;CHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
APPENDICES 
SCHEDULE A 
(<CAPTION OF COURT AND CAUSE OMIT'TED) 
INDICTMENT 
The Grand Jurors of the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, accuse C. W. BRADY, JR. of the crime of 
PERJURY IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 45, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as follows, to-wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1965 at 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the said 
C. W. BRADY, Jr. committed Perjury in the 
First Degree by falsely testifying before the Hon-
orable Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, after having 
been duly sworn upon oath to tell the truth to 
the following material facts : 
Q. "Did l\fr. Newsom inform you of the time of 
departure and when you were going to leave~ Did 
he have anything to do with the arrangements 
for the trip? 
A. I don't think so, no." 
Q. "Did you ever discuss this with Mr. Newsom 
prior to his submitting the lease to the County 
that was eventually signed? 
A. "Never did I ever discuss the machine with 
anybody." 
J Q. "After you returned to Salt Lake, and before 
you were informed that Midvale Motors had pu~­




A. You bet, we were. 
A. Q. And were any n~ports submitted to you as 
to the result of the tests 1 
A. ~fr. N erdin contacted me quite frequently, 
and >vent out to the scene quite frequently to see 
the tests. ::J 
Q. "Do you remember whether or not it was used 
during September of 19631 
A. No, I would not know. 
Q. Do you know whether it was used during Oc-
tober of 19631 
A. No. You'd have to go back to the records on 
that. 
Q. Do you know whether it was used during No-
vember of 19631 
A. No but I'm sure the records we'd have would 
show whether it was or was not. 
J Q "Are you aware of the fact that the machine 
was not used at all during January and February 
and part of December 1 
A. As I recall, the machine was used, and I think 
we used it in the Chesterfield area, and I think 
we used the machine right up until Christmas. 
B. Q. Do you know that it sat in the lot down there 
not being used through January and February1 
A. No, I didn't know this." 
Q. "Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn back in 
Tndiana discussing the fact that they put their 
machine away from Labor Day until May1 
A. No, I do not. We used this machine up until 
December, I'm sure, right until Christmastime.'.:..! 
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fQ. ''Did Mr. N erdin ever inform you that the 
machine was sitting idle during January. 
A. Oh, I knew the machine was - as a matter 
of fact, at that time we used it, like I say, up until 
December, and the weather moved in, and we was 
C. hoping to get the project completed in Chester-
field, and we left the machine in Chesterfield. 
And then we had to take it from Chesterfield back 
out to the shop, and this was sometime in J rurn-
ary. We had to get the machine out of there.:J 
fQ. "What other type of equipment have you 
leased in the past for the County~ 
D. A. I think we leased a garbage packer or two of 
them through the Purchasing Department. I think 
we also and are presently leasing from - well, 
you can check the name. It would be in the rec-
ords. Leasing some sweepers.:.J 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State 
aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and against 
the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
No. 6 
A true bill 
Russell C. Bendixen 
FOREMAN OF THE GRAND JURY 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
SCHEDULE B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Before you can convict the defendant, C. W. Brady, 
Jr. of perjury in the first degree you must find each of 
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!he following elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. That C. \V. Brady, .Jr. was sworn to tell the 
truth before a Salt Lake City Judge on or 
about 7 'Thfay 1965 in Salt Lake County. 
By "sworn" the court means to take an 
oath and promise to speak honestly and com-
pletely concerning the truth as he believed 
it to be. 
2. That while under said above-oath G. 'lv. Brady 
Jr. intentionally and wilfully testified in words 
in substance being inconsistent with fact as fol-
lows: 
A. That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words cal-
culated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge 
Jones to understand that Salt Lake 
County tested the "bit paver" before 
leasing it substantially more exclusive 
than it was in fa.ct so tested and that at 
least part of such representation was in 
substance as follows : 
"Question: After you returned to Salt 
Lake, and before you were informed 
that Midvale Motors had purchased this 
machine, was the County testing this 
machine~ 
Answer : You bet, we were. 
Question: And were any reports sub-
mitted to you as to the result of the 
tests~ 
Answer: Mr. N erdin contacted me quite 
frequently, and I went out to the scene 
quite frequently to see the tests." 
and/or 
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B. That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words cal-
culated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge 
Jones to understand that the "bit paver" 
was used much later in the year of 1963 
than was the fact, and that at least part. 
of such representation was in substance 
as follows: 
"Question: Are you aware of the fact 
that the machine was not used at all 
during January and February and part 
of December? 
Answer : As I recall, the machine was 
used, and I think we used it in the Ches-
terfield area, and I think we used the 
machine right up until Christmas." 
**** 
"Question : Do you remember .Mr. 
Schemahorn back in Indiana discussing 
the fact that they put their machine 
away from Labor Day until May1 
Answer : No, I do not. We used this 
machine up until December, I'm sure, 
right until Christmastime." 
And/or 
C. That C. W. Brady Jr. spoke words cal-
culated by Mr. Brady Jr. to lead Judge 
Jones to understand that the bit paver 
was not placed in the Salt Lake County 
shop yard till substantially later than 
it was in fact so placed and that at least 
in part such representation was in sub-
stance as follows : 
"Question: Did Mr. N erdin ever inform 
you that the machine was sitting idle 
during January 7 
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"Ansvver: Oh, I knew the machine was 
- as a matter of fact, at that time we 
used it, like I say, up until December, 
and the weather moved in, and we was 
hoping to get the project completed in 
Chesterfield, and we left the machine 
in Chesterfield. And then we had to 
take it from Chesterfield back out to 
the shop, and this was sometime in 
January. We had to get the machine 
out of there." 
And/or 
D. That C. \V. Brady Jr. spoke words cal-
culated by Mr. Brady to lead Judge 
Jones to understand that no other lease 
of such equipment was in effect with 
or through Ted Newsom or any com-
pany represented by him when in fact 
a lease existed on an Alas-Chalmers 
tractor and that at least in part such 
representation was in substance as fol-
lows: 
"Question: What other type of equip-
ment have you leased in the past for 
the county~ 
Answer: I think we leased a garbage 
packer or two of them through the Pur-
chasing Department. I think we also 
and are presently leasing from - well, 
you can check the name. It would be 
in the records. Leasing some sweepers." 
It must be recognized that the State must prove 
onlv one of the above alleged false statements, but may 
prove more than one. 
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That at the time C. W. Brady Jr. spoke the words 
proven as in two above, if any, C. W. Brady Jr. was 
conscious that he was representing contrary to fact. A 
mere honest mistake or misunderstanding, no matter how : 
serious, is not perjury but perjury may come about if 
one consciously and wilfully 
A. States as a fact that which is not true, or 
B. States he has knowledge or a belief when he 
knows he does not enjoy that state of mind, 
and knows it, or 
C. States he does not have knowledge or a belief , 
when he knows he, in fact, had such knowledge 
or belief, or 
D. Or a combination of ABC, or AB, or BC, etc. 
When the information charges in the same count 
that the defendant made more than one perjured state-
ment, the proof need show that he made only one of 
such statements to support a conviction provided that 
as to that one statement the proof is adequate under 
the law and shows that every essential element of the 
crime of perjury, as I have defined those elements, was 
present in the making of such statement. 
3. That the falsehood was material in the pro-
ceeding. 
An essential element of the crime of perjury in the 
first degree is that the matter falsely sworn to be true 
be material to a valid issue in the proceeding, in or for 
which the statement is made. If it is not thus material 
the making of the statement however false or repre-
hensible, is not perjury in the first degree. 
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But the matter sworn to, need not be directly and 
i111111<'diately material; and if not the requirement of the 
law as to materiality is met if the false statement is so 
('Onnrckd with a fact \\'hich is directly in issue as to 
have a natural tendency to prove or disprove such a 
fart either by itself bearing circumstantially on the ques-
tion, or by giving weight to or directing from any other 
evidence on the issue. In short, the test of materiality is 
whether or not the statement could have properly influ-
Pnced the tribunal upon the question at issue before it. 
The alleged issue at the time of the alleged oath 
was given is alleged to be: Judge Jones' judicial deter-
1 mination of how to act on Delmar Larson's allegation 
that is set out in the exhibit ------· 
If you find elements one, two, and three proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt it is your duty to convict 
the defendant of perjury in the first degree. If you find 
elements one, two, so proven but not element three then 
it is your duty to convict of only second degree perjury, 
that is a lesser included offense and occurs when all 
elements of perjury in the first degree are present except 
the third above. If you do not find element one and two 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt you must acquit C. 
W. Brady Jr. the defendant. 
SCHEDULE C 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
(CAPTION OF CO (TR'r AND CA USE OMITTED) 
In answer to defendant's Request for Bill of Par-
ticulars, plaintiff submits the following: 
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1. A complaint entitled the State of Utah vs. Joh;n 
Doe, Jane Doe and Richard Doe, a copy of which is 
attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A", was duly issued 
by the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, a duly elected and 
qualified Judge of the City Court of Salt Lake ·City, 
State of Utah, on the 22nd day of April 1965, after the 
complainant, Delmar L. Larson personally appeared be-
fore said Judge and after being duly sworn upon oath 
attested to the truthfulness of the allegations therein con-
tained where the defendants \Vere charged with the crime 
of Accessory to the crime of Attempting to Bribe Execu-
tive Officer in violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 45, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Court thereby acquired 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in said 
complaint and proceeded under Title 77, Chapter 11, 
Section 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953 to bring before 
the Court the defendant C. W. Brady, Jr. and after 
placing him under oath proceeded to interrogate him in 
open court in question and answer form, the same being 
reported by Ned E. Greenig, ·Certified Shorthand Re-
porter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
the same being reduced to writing, the District Attorney, 1 
Jay E. Banks, a duplicate original copy of same, and 
said matters being material to the allegations in said 
complaint, and after examining said defendant, C. W. 
Brady, Jr., and others with reference thereto, the said 
Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court of Salt Lake 
City, State of Utah, as such on the 12th day of May 1965, 
issued Salt Lake City complaint No. 42895 entitled State 
of Utah vs. Clarence William Brady, Jr. a/k/a C. W. 
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Buck Brady, Jr., charging said defendant with Making a 
Profit Out of or Mi::msing Public Funds; Salt Lake City 
~ase No. 42896 entitled State of Utah vs. Clarence Wil-
limn Brady, Jr., a/k/a C. \V. Buck Brady, Jr. charging 
~aid defendant with Asking for or Receiving a Bribe 
as an Executive Officer of Salt Lake County; and Salt 
Lake City case No. 42897 entitled State of Utah vs. 
Theodore M. Newsom and charging said defendant with 
Brihing an Executive Officer, said complaints arising out 
of the John Doe complaints heretofore referred to. That 
all of said complaints heretofore ref erred to were duly 
issued by the said City Judge Maurice D. Jones, after 
being duly sworn to by Delmar L. Larson as complaining 
witness. 
2. All of the alleged testimony contained in the In-
uictment is not claimed to be false. 
3. All of the subject matter of the Indictment is 
material to the charge set forth in the copy of the attached 
complaint. 
4. That portion of the Indictment relating to New-
som's not making arrangements for the trip is false. The 
portion of the Indictment relating to the defendant's 
never discussing the bit paver with Newsom prior to his 
~ubmitting the lease to the County is false. [!he portion 
~ of the transcript as to extensive testing of the bit paver 
is false. The testing consisted of two days only - on 
or about August 13, 1963 and on or about August 17, 
196!) (!hat portion of the testimony of using the bit 
B. paver up to Christmastime is false J ~nd J it was taken 
C. ~k to the ~hops in January _fromChe_sterfield is fals~ 
!2-1hat portion of the transcript r~rmg to other equip-
D. ment leased by the County is fals.:j 
JAY E. BANKS, District Attorney 
Third Judicial District 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
I !\HIBIT A 
I \TTACHED TO BILL OF PARTICULARS 
r 
I 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
' vs. I 11HN DOE, JANE DOE and 
~'!CHARD ·:o-o-E········································ 
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In the City Court 
OF SALT LAKE CITY 
Before lVI. D. JONES 
Judge of the City Court 




I . . .. = -;;~;~~~:.~; 
On this 22nd day of April, A.D. 1965, before me, M. D. JONES, 
1uuge of the City Court within and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
mnty, State of Utah, personally appeared Delmar L. Larson, who, 
1 being sworn by me on his oath, did say that John Doe, Jane Doe 
iu Richard Doe on or about the 23rd day of August, A.D. 1963, at 
I
de County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, did commit the crime of 
ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE 
I EXECUTIVE OFFICER, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Sec-' lion 45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows, to-wit: 
( That the said John Doe, Jane Doe and Richard Doe, at the 
I
, time and place aforesaid, having full knowledge that a felony 
had been committed, to-wit: the attempted bribery of an 
executive officer, in violation of 76-1-30 and 76-28-3, Utah 
I 
Code Annotated, 1953, did conceal same from a magistrate; 
1'ntrary to the provisions_ of the Stat~te of the State afor_esa!d, in 
·uth cases made and provided, and agamst the peace and dignity of 
r· st,te of Utah. SUbiC:.~dzn:L;:~~~~;O~~~. 
the day and year first above written. 
M. D. JONES 
City Judge 
SCHEDULED 
Instruction No. 2 
You are instructed that allegations of the indictment 
are as follows : 
I 
That the witness Jones is a city Judge of Salt Lake ! 
City. That on or about the 7th day of May 1965 Judge 
Jones was acting as a judge and had be.fore him for 
consideration an allegation by a person named Delmar 
L. Larson, who swore that one had attempted to bribe 
an Executive Officer in violation of Utah Statute; and 
that other persons were accessory to such an offense in 
that they had knowledge of the felony but had concealed 
it, or secreted it; the allegation was that the conduct 
had occurred on or about the 23rd day of August in 
1963, that Delmar Larson was alleging 
"That the said John Doe, Jane Doe and Richard 
Doe, at the time and place aforesaid, having full 
knowledge that a felony had been committed, to-
wit: the attempted bribery of an executive officer, 
in violation of 76-1-30 and 76-28-3 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, did conceal same from a magistrate" 
That Judge Jones was attempting to search out informa-
tion to make a judicial determination of whether or not . 
he as Judge should or should not issue process and what I 
form, if any, it should take, if issued. 
'That Judge Jones, pursuant to this indeavor, did I 
request the defendant, C. W. Brady, Jr. to take an oath , 
to answer truthfully concerning the matter under inquiry. 
That Mr. Brady consented and was duly sworn and ques-
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lioned, and made answers. The indictment alleges that 
~Ir. Hrnd~, in violation of this oath committed perjury 
in tl1at he intentionally, and wilfully and contrary to law 
gave untrue answers with an intent to mislead Judge 
Jones when such might lead or encourage Judge Jones 
into not acting correctly in the matter. So far as this 
proceeding before you jurors here today, the prosecu-
tion relies on the following particular allegations as per-
t' i jury: 
i 1. That Mr. Brady was asked the following ques-
lions and Mr. Brady gave the following answers with an 
intention of misleading Judge Jones into understanding 
the bit paver had undergone materially more extensive 
testing in Salt Lake County than was the fact, whereas 
', it had been tested only on two days before the county 
leased the machine: 
"Question: After you returned to Salt Lake, and 
heforp you were informed that Midvale Motors 
had purchased this machine, was the county test-
ing this machine~ 
Answer : You bet, we were. 
Question: And were any reports submitted to you 
as to the result of the tests~ 
Answer: l\Ir. Nerdin contacted me quite fre-
quently, and went out to the scene quite fre-
quently to see the tests." 
And it is alleged that l\fr. Brady's testimony above taken 
in context and as intended, was a perjurous attempt to 
mislead Judge Jones in that he might believe the method 
u:scd by Salt Lake County in leasing the machines was 
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contrary to what was the fact; and might reasonably i 
affect Judge Jones' action if the matter of the gener~l ' 
allegations made by Delmar Larson. 
2 . That Mr. Brady was asked concerning when the , 
"bit paver" was last used in 1963 in the following ques- I 
tion and made the following answer with intent to mislead : 
Judge Jones into understanding that the "bit paver" . 
was used much later in the year than was true, thereby 
possibly leading Judge Jones into understanding the con- I 
tract lease was more favorable to Salt Lake County than ! 
true and the failure to cancel the lease more favorable 
in that the season of its use more nearly matched the 
contract period than was true and such statements might 
reasonably have misguided .Judge Jones in his detennin· 
ation as to how to act on Delmar Larson's allegations 
"Question : Are you aware of the fact that 
the machine was not used at all during January 
and February and part of December~ 
Answer : As I recall, the machine was used, and 
I think we used it in the Chesterfield area, and 
I think we used the machine right up until 
Christmas. 
Question: Do you remember Mr. Schemahorn 
back in Indiana discussing the fact that they put 
their machine away from Labor Day until May? 
Answer: No, I do not. We used this machine 
up until December, I'm sure, right until Christmas-
time." 
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\\ lwn i11 f'ad tit(• hit pavn \\'as rn·ver used aftl'r ~ovem­
l)('r ~II a11d ::\fr. Brad~· km·\\- that hl·, :.\Ir. Brady \\HS not 
i11fo1·u1Pd affin11ativPly of its use in DPcernlwr. 
:3. ~\l:-;o it ii'i here charged that for the same purpose 
n~ of :2 ahove Mr. Bra<ly was questioned concerning the 
urn('hine's use and place in January of 1964. On ques-
tioning hP made an answer intentionally calculated to mis-
IP<Hl .Judge Jones in that he stated he affirmatively 
krn·w tlw bit paver was not returned to the shops till 
Jnanuary 196-! which statement l\Ir. Brady made knowing 
it \ms not the state of his information in that he knew 
hl· did 11ot know when it was returned or knew it was 
rdnrrn'll in an earlier month, in question and answer as 
follows: 
"Question: Did l\Ir. N erdin ever inform you that 
tlw machine was sitting idle during January~ 
Answer: Oh, I knew the machine was - as a 
matter of fact, at that time we used it, like I say, 
up until December, and the weather moved in, and 
\H' was hoping to get the project completed in 
Ch<>stcrfil'ld, and we left the machine in Chester-
fi<'ld. And then \Ve had to take it from Chester-
field back out to the shop, and this was sometime 
in January. We had to get the machine out of 
th<> re." 
±. 'rha t Judge Jones asked concerning other leased 
11iaehi1wry but 1\Ir. Brady's answer thereto was perjurous 
a)](l ealculated by Mr. Brady to omit reference to an 
"\las-Cliahners tractor leased through l\Ir. Newsom, the 
~Hllll' person who pffected the "bit paver" lease; said 
a11~w1•r purporting to refer to all such leases and said 
tiO 
answer could logically lead Judge Jones to believe Mr. 
Newsom had no other lease with the county to be enquired 
into, and that belief could logically mislead Judge Jones 
in his taking of testimony and in acting on Delmar 
Larson's allegations. 
Question: What other type of equipment hav~ 
you leased in the past for the county? 
Answer: I think we leased a garbage packer or 
two of them through the purchasing department. 
I think we also and are presently leasing from -
well, you can check the name. It would be in the 
records. Leasing some sweepers." 
To these allegations the defendant has plead not guilty, 
in effect denying that they are true. 
NOTE: No effort has been made to correct, as to spelling, 
punctuation, or graniaitical errors appearing 'in arny of 
the above schedules, as reprod-uced from the originals 
of the respective documents. 
